Policies to Combat Depression by Karl A. Fox
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Policies to Combat Depression





Chapter Title: The Contribution of Farm Price Support Programs to General
Economic Stability
Chapter Author: Karl A. Fox
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2808
Chapter pages in book: (p. 295 - 356)THE CONTRIBUTION OF
FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS TO
GENERAL ECONOMIC STABILITY
KAJU. A. Fox, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Eversince 1929, price support activities have been a central element
in the farm program. From decade to decade, research, technology,
and education may be more fundamental to the improvement of
agriculture and rural life. But from year to year, price support has
been the major, and at times the most controversial, expression of
public policy in the field of agriculture.
In framing price support legislation, Congress probably has been
most influenced by considerations of prospective benefits to farmers
relative to prospective costs to the federal Treasury. The interests of
processors, distributors, and consumers have, of course, been given
some weight, as have problems of reconciling farm policy with
policy in other fields such as labor, social security, and international
trade. The central issues in legislative debate are the level of price
support, the commodities for which price support is to be mandatory
rather than and the methods by which the farm price
level objectives are to be attained.
From a practical standpoint, then, price support programs are
chosen largely on the basis of their effects on the level and stability
of particular farm prices. Effects on farm income are less clearly
recognized. However, as the domestic demand for most farm prod-
ucts is less than unit elastic, a program which increases farm prices
will generally increase farm income during at least the first few
years of its operation. The effects of farm price supports on general
economic stability have not been spelled out clearly even in the
technical literature, and considerations of these effects have not
thus far entered in •a major way into the selection of alternative
farm programs.'
The views expressed in this paper are the author's. They are not official findings
of the agency by which he is employed.
'It is probably true that many legislators have been influenced by an intuitive
feeling that stabilizing prices of farm products must somehow contribute to
stability in the economy as a whole. Allegations that depressions are farm-fed
and farm-led, or that an increase of one dollar in farm income causes an increase
of seven dollars in national income, are frequently made in connection with price
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This paper attempts to analyze the effects of a farm price support
program as one of a number of built-in safeguards against depres-
sion. The paper includes, first, a discussion of the place of agriculture
in the general economy; second, a detailed examination of the
workings of the existing price support program during a hypothetical
recession; and third, a brief consideration of the behavior of alter-
native price support programs in a similar recession and the differ-
ences, if any, in their contributions to general economic stability.
1. The Place of Agriculture in the General Economy
The relative importance of agriculture in the general economy
determines, of course, how far any farm price support program can
affect economic stability. Agriculture is important not only for its
sheer economic size but also for its dynamic interrelationships with
other parts of the economy.
ECONOMIC SIZE
In 1952 the gross national product for the United States economy
as a whole was estimated at $348 billion.. A comparable measure
for the farm economy itself—the so-called "gross farm product"—
in the same year was $23.5 billion, or slightly less than 7 per cent
of total GNP. In the same year, employment in agriculture averaged
about 6.8 million workers, equivalent to 11 per cent of the employed
labor force. However, average income per worker was lower in
agriculture than in other sectors of the economy.
Several alternative measures of the economic size of agriculture
could be used, but they would give results somewhere between the
two just mentioned. Of these possible measures, the series on cash
receipts from farm marketings will frequently be used in this paper
as a convenient but rough measure of the size of. agriculture. In
1952, cash receipts from farm marketings were $32.4 billion, equiva-
lent to 9 per cent of GNP. This concept is, however, "grosser" than
that of GNP.
CROSS-SECTION INTERBELATIONSHIPS
Major sources of cash farm income in the United States in 1947
are shown in Table 1. Each source of cash receipts is the destination
of a flow of goods moving off the farm. Impacts resulting from
changes in demand for farm products and their derivatives are
support arguments, but it is not clear that they carry much weight in the final
legislative decisions. . ..
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transmitted to the farm economy in the form of changes in the
volume of these money flows and the prices and volumes of sales
associated with them. Because of the existence of some special data
for the year 1947, a number of these interrelationships will be dis-
cussed in terms of that year.2 The general picture would be much
the same in 1952 and other recent years.
TABLE I










Total cash receipts from farm marketings $29.75 100.0%
Sales for food use by domestic civilians 18.23 81.3
Food use by armed forces














a Equivalentfarm values of commodity flows.
b Includes changes in nonfarm stocks, statistical discrepancies, and rounding
errors.
In 1947, nearly 10 per cent of total farm cash receipts represented
commodities exported to foreign countries, plus a more limited
movement to United States territories. Another sizable flow, nearly
9 per cent, was derived from sales to other farmers. Most of these
sales were mediated by the marketing system. Available, data re-
port only such sales of livestock as moved across state lines. About
half of the value of "interfarm sales" represents the receipts of
original producers from feed grains and hay purchased, directly or
ultimately, by other farmers. Much of this feed was processed by
the mixed feed and milling industries, and the price paid for end
products by purchasing farmers averaged roughly twice thatre-
ceived for the raw products by original producers.
Over 60 per cent of the cash receipts in 1947 were derived from
sales for food use by the domestic civilian population. About 1.7
2 The 1947 data cited were prepared in the former Bureau of Agricultural
Economics in connection with the Interindustry Relations Study of the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. In the following tables these data have been rearranged to
conform with certain regularly published series of the Agricultural Marketing
Service (see Karl A. Fox and Harry C. Norcross, "Some Relationships between
Agriculture and the General Economy," Agricultural Economics Research, Janu-
ary 1952, pp. 13—21).
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per cent represented food use by the armed forces. Another 17.6
per cent were derived from sales of nonfood products and by-prod-
ucts for domestic use, including cotton, tobacco, and portions of
various other commodities.
Table 2 shows a breakdown of these major sources of cash farm
income among nine major commodity groups. It will be noted that
the great bulk of cash receipts from meat animals, dairy products,
poultry and eggs, and fruits and vegetables is derived from sales
for food use by the domestic population. Exports and shipments are
small for these commodities. Interfarm sales of meat animals, pri-
marily feeder and stocker cattle, are fairly large ($1.2 billion),
but prices and values of feeder cattle move up and down with the
demand for meat animals for food use. A sizable proportion of the
cash income from food grains (mainly wheat), cotton, and tobacco
comes from the export market. Hence, in the absence of price sup-
ports, prices of these products are subject to impacts from all parts
of the world economy.
Farm price support programs contribute to economic stability
mainly by offsetting or diverting the impacts upon farm income of
changes in the demand for farm products. Table 3 reflects the fact
that changes in domestic consumer demand for food products must
be transmitted through the distributing, processing, and trans-
portation industries before being translated into impacts upon farm
income. In 1947, a year of extreme inflation, the farmer's share of
the consumer's food dollar (valued at retail store prices) was at a
near-record level of 53 per cent. Marketing charges, in the broad-
est sense, absorbed less than 40 per cent of the consumer's dollar
spent for meat, poultry, and eggs, and about 45percent of the
consumer's dollar spent for dairy products. The marketing system
absorbed almost 60 per cent of the consumer expenditures for fruits
and vegetables and more than two-thirds of the consumer expendi-
tures for cereal and bakery products. The farm value of the grain
used in bakery and cereal products was little more than 20 per cent
as large as the amount spent for such products by consumers.
'While similar breakdowns are not available for cotton, wool, and
tobacco products, the farmer's share of the retail dollar spent for
these items ranged from 12 to 17 per cent. The marketing margin
concept is hardly appropriate for cotton used in industrial fabrics,
such as tire cord, bagging, and conveyor belts.
Marketing margins are notoriouslyrigid.Freight ratesare
changed only at considerable intervals. Processing costs include
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than 50 per cent of the total food marketing bill is required to
cover costs of labor directly involved in transportation, distribu-
tion, and processing activities. The wage rates of these workers
are largely determined in a labor market which extends over the
whole range of industrial and service occupations. Thus food
marketing charges are only slightly affected by changes in either
the retail or the farm price of food products. If prices and wage
rates in other parts of the economy are rigid, any sudden drop in
retail prices of food is transmitted (in the absence of price supports)
almost dollar for dollar to the farm
Farmers buy from as well as sell to the rest of the economy. Table
4 shows a breakdown of cash production expenditures, plus depreci-
ation allowances, for the year 1947. Production expenditures in
that year totaled $17.2 billion. Of this, $1.4 billion went for live-
stock moving across state lines and involving only transportation and
related services in addition to the prices received by other farmers
in the state of origin. Farmers spent $3.7 billion for feed, of which
roughly $2.0. billion was reflected back to other farmers and $1.7
billion distributed among marketing agencies. Over $2.8 billion was
spent on hired labor. Operation of motor vehicles cost $1.6 billion
and miscellaneous goods and services used in farm production $2.5
billion. Taxes, interest, and net rent claimed another $2.6 billion,
and the allowance for depreciation on farm buildings and equip-
ment was also $2.6 billion. Actual cash outlays for building and
equipment may, of course, differ substantially from the depreciation
allowance in any one year.
As in the case of marketing margins, production expenditures
are relatively inflexible. The quantities purchased of many of these
items are dictated, by technological requirements—so many units
of gasoline or hours of machine use are necessary to handle an
acre of a given crop, and the individual farmer has nothing to gain
The moderate degree of correlation which exists between changes in retail
food prices and in food marketing margins is due primarily to the common effect
of general economic activity upon wage rates, upon costs and prices of manu-
factured items, and upon consumer demand for food as expressed in terms of retail
prices and consumption. If consumer income and employment were held constant
at a stable general price level, a decline in retail food prices, presumably caused
by an increase in food supplies, would likely be transmitted' almost dollar for
dollar to the farm level. This implies percentage changes in farm prices from
to 2 or more times as large as changes at retail, varying by commodity. If the
quantity of a farm product available or its rate of production remains fixed, the
net effect of a change in consumer demand is a change in its farm price with no
immediate change in consumption. However, if the commodity is backed by an
effective price support program, much of the impact of a decline in consumer













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS
by curtailing his total acreage. Quantities of fertilizer may be cut
back, but this will jeopardize output. The individual's taxes, inter-
est, and rental payments are beyond his control and are relatively
rigid over a period of two or three years. Prices of petroleum prod-
ucts, steel-using items, and other industrial products used by farmers
are determined in a nationwide market so far as demand factors
are concerned, and the individual prices are often administered by
manufacturers. Due to locational factors, wage rates of hired farm
labor are sympathetic to changes in farm prices, but only partly
so. In many areas, nonfarm work is readily available, and the
farmer-employer must compete with industrial wage rates.
Over a period of years the index of prices paid by farmers (in-
cluding interest, taxes, and farm wage rates) has fluctuated from
year to year only half as much percentagewise as has the index of
prices received for commodities sold by farmers. A significant frac-
tion of the movement shown by the prices-paid index is due to vari-
ations in the prices of livestock and feed purchased by farmers.
Farmers also buy consumers' goods from other sectors of the
economy. Data on expenditures for farm family living on a nation-
ally representative basis are limited. However, in most essential
respects farmers' demands for nonf arm consumers' goods are simi-
lar to those of other consumers. A notable exception is the smaller
proportion of net farm income going for purchased food; another
is the relatively low imputed rental value of farm dwellings (cash
rents for the farm dwelling as such are rare). Incidentally, the
evaluation of food produced for farm-home use and imputed rents
of farm dwellings is a major area of controversy in comparing the
real incomes of farm and nonfarm people, or defining "parity in-
come." The official evaluations of these items for the year 1947 are
given in Table 4.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that farm price supports oper-
ate at the cash receipts or gross income level. As net farm income
averages less than half as large as gross, a 10 per cent drop in the
price of a farm product may mean a 20 per cent drop in the net
income received from a given volume of output. Net farm income,
as defined in Table 4, includes all returns for the labor of farm
operators and unpaid family workers as well as for the operator's
investment and his management function. Hence, in terms of income
available for family living, a 10 per cent change in farm prices may
be as serious for many farm families as a 15 or 20 per cent change
in wage rates would be for industrial workers.
Farm income and employment vary widely in the various regions
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of the country. Table 5showsthat in 1952, in the New England
and Middle East group of states, agricultural income payments
accounted for less than 2 per cent of total income payments. The
Southeast is a major farming region, but agriculture accounted for
only 11.5 per cent of its total income payments. The percentage
was almost the same in the Southwest, including the important
agricultural states of Texas and Oklahoma.
TABLE 5











Payments Payments of Total
New England $ 16,685 $266 1.6%
Middle East 68,873 1,033 1.5
Southeast 36,160 4,158 11.5
Southwest 17,049 1,944 11.4
Central 72,997 5,183 7.1
Northwest 12,873 2,613 20.3 '
Far West 80,780 1,970 ' .6.4
United States $255,367 $17,167 . 6.7%
Computed from columns 1 and 3.
Source: Compiled from Survey of Current Business, Dept. of Commerce, Au-
gust 1953, pp. 9 and 12.
The Central region, including' most of the Corn Belt and the
Lake States,is an important and relatively prosperous farming
area. However, in view of the great manufacturing and trading
centers in the region, agriculture accounted for only 7.1 per cent
of its total income payments. The Northwest region, including the
Northern Great Plains and some of the Mountain States, shows
the highest 'proportion of agricultural to total income payments
among the regions listed—20.3 per cent. This region contains only
a few large cities and industrial centers. The Far West shows about
the same relation between agricultural and total income payments
(6.4 per cent in 1952) as does the nation as a whole (6.7 per cent
in 1952).
Except for the Northwest region, these figures ,suggest that the
immediate impact of changes in farm income upon other sectors of
the be rather small. However, there are individual
states for which the farm income percentages run much higher:
Arkansas 22, Mississippi 24, Arizona 18, Iowa 28, Idaho and Kansas
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each 22, Montana 21, Nebraska 27, North Dakota 26, South Dakota
31. The last six states mentioned are all in the Northwest region.
Table 6 compares farm and nonfarm labor forces for the year
1950 by major regions. Because per worker incomes are lower in
agriculture than for the average of nonfarm occupations, the per-
centage of the total labor force engaged in agriculture is higher
in each region than the corresponding percentage of income pay-
ments going to agriculture. The greatest disparity is in the South,
TABLE6










Northeast 15,446,331 481,467 3%
North Central 17,220,229 2,380,518 14
South 16,494,500 3,184,278 19
West , 17,064,280 709,784 10 .
United States 56,225,330 6,706,047 11%
Source: Compiled from Census of Population, 1950, Bureau of the Census.
which in 1950 included nearly 50 per cent of the farm labor force
of the nation but received about 40 per cent of the nation's agricul-
tural income payments.
A drop in farm income in• an area directly affects the townspeople
in that area who sell goods and services to farm people. The im-
pact of reduced purchasing power in the area is then diffused
among the larger distributing and manufacturing centers from
which the various goods used in the area are supplied. The effects
of a highly localized drought or flood upon farm incomes might
cause scarcely a ripple in the big wholesaling and manufacturing
centers. A, substantial drop in the price of wheat, on the other hand,
could reduce the incomes of farmers in a few neighboring states
by $200 or 300 million. Such a drop would cause an appreciable
reduction (as much as 5 per cent) in total income payments in a
several-state area. While additional income effects would radiate
into other regions, their percentage impacts would be small.
DYNAMIC INTERRELATIONSHIPS
In the preceding section we have described some major cross-











































500 100 300 400
Gross product
G Nonconsumption expenditures equals gross product less personal consumption
expenditures.
bPersonal income adjusted equals personal income less government business transfer
























































































CExcluding cottOn, wheat, and tobacco.
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Each element of marketing charges and cash costs of production is
a channel through which influences originating primarily in the
nonfarm economy may be transmitted into the net income state-
ments of farm operators. The tables showing commodity flows out
of agriculture to different end uses give some indication of the
vulnerability of particular farm prices to changes in the various
categories of final demand.
While the diversity of conditions within agriculture generally
forces us to frame price support programs in terms of individual
commodities, there are certain dynamic interrelationships between
agriculture and the rest of the economy which can profitably be
discussed on an aggregative level.
Aggregative Relationships. Some important relationships are sug-
gested in Charts 1 andIf we disregard the three major export
crops—cotton, wheat, and tobacco—cash farm income from all
other commodities bears a close relationship to disposable personal
income.
If we are tracing the impact of changed conditions upon a single
farm commodity, we may generally regard changes in domestic and
foreign demand as determined outside the agricultural economy.
But if we add up such impacts for all (or a large number of) farm
products, we find that the individual commodity models are, for
some purposes, incomplete. For example, during 1922—1941 a
year-to-year change of $10 billion in United States disposable in-
come was associated with an average change of more than $1 billion
in cash receipts from farm marketings. But production expenditures
also tended to increase with cash receipts. For each $1 billion
change in cash receipts from one year to the next, farm purchases
of livestock and feed tended to change by more than $100 million
and the farm wage bill changed an average of $80 million. Farm
wages were influenced by the prevailing level of nonf arm wage
rates and the ease with which nonfarm employment could be ob-
tained.
To some extent, the above relations are internal to the farm
economy. But cash outlays for other production requisites, includ-
ing net investment in farm buildings and equipment, changed about
$300 million in association with year-to-year changes of $1 billion
in cash receipts. This association may be regarded in large part as
a "back effect" of farm income upon the nonfarm economy.
These charts are reproduced from James P. Cavin, "Forecasting the Demand
for Agricultural Products," Agricultural Economics Research, July 1952, pp.
65—76.
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As an average during 1922—1941, the realized net income of farm
operators rose nearly $700 million in response to a year-to-year in-
crease of $1 billion in cash receipts from marketings.5 Of this, over
$100 million represented net new investment in farm buildings
and equipment, an item mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The remainder also had a back effect on the nonfarm economy
through increased expenditures on goods and services for family
living.
Hence if we try to trace the ultimate effects of an initial decrease
in consumer income, we are led through a series of approximations.
The "first round" decrease in farm cash receipts leads to a secondary
decrease in nonfarm income (perhaps no more than 10 per cent of
the initial one). This leads to a secondary decrease in farm income,
which produces a third-order effect on nonfarm income (perhaps
no more than 1 per cent of the initial decrease).
But we must also consider another stream of influences. The bulk
of the initial contraction in consumer income means reduced out-
lays for nonfarm goods and services. This curtailment leads to a
decrease in nonfarm employment and income, which reinforces
the original one and leads to a further (but smaller) contraction in
expenditures. If, for example, a cut in defense spending and private
investment reduced the rate of income payments directly by $10
billion, the final decrease in the level of consumer income might be
around $20 billion.6 If so, farm cash receipts would tend to decrease
by twice the amount suggested by the initial impact, rather than by
1.11 times that amount as suggested by considering back effects
through farm income only.
If the "multiplier" at a given time were about 2, one might expect
that the effect of a price support program in maintaining total
national income would be about twice as large as the government
outlay for price support. Of the total income-supporting effect, a
little more than half would accrue to farmers (at the cash receipts
level) and a little less than half would accrue to nonfarmers. If
The sum of net income and production expenditures (including depreciation
allowances) is equal to gross farm income. Gross income is larger than cash re-
ceipts by the• imputed rental value of farm dwellings and the value of home-
grown products consumed by the farm family. The latter value changes directly
with cash receipts, because the price components of the two series are quite simi-
lar. As a result, gross farm income during 1922—1941 changed about $1.1 billion
per $1 billion change in cash receipts. Production expenditures (including de-
preciation allowances) accounted for a little more than $400 million and net
income for a little less than $700 million of the change in gross farm income.
6Magnitudebased on Arthur Smithies, "The Multiplier," American Economic
Review, May 1948, pp. 299—805.
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the multiplier were 2.5,thetotal effect would be 2.5 times the
price support outlay, divided about equally between farm and non-.
farm people.
Demand and Supply Relationships for Individual Commodities;
An aggregative relationship which has been useful in the outlook
work of the Department of Agriculture is as follows:
log (prices received by farmers) =2.812
—1.658 log (physical volume of farm marketings)
(.273)
+1.241 log (disposable income)
(.102) .
+.142log (value of agricultural exports).•
(.035) .
Thefigures in parentheses are standard errors. During the. period
1924—1947, 97 per cent of the variation in the index of prices re-
ceived by farmers was associated with the three explanatory varia-
bles shown. The relevance of this relationship to a discussion of
farm price supports may be suggested as follows:
1. A 10 per cent drop in disposable income leads to a 12.4 per
cent drop in farm prices, other factors remaining constant.
This price drop could be offset by a reduction of 7.5 per cent
(equal to 12.4/1.66) in the volume of farm marketings. Qr, if all
prices were rigidly supported at their initial levels, the price sup-
port agency would acquire 7.5 per cent of. the total quantity of
farm products marketed.
2. An increase of. 10 .per cent in the physical volume of farm mar-
ketings would tend to reduce farm prices about 16.6 per cent. Or,
if prices were rigidly maintained, the entire increase in farm market-
ings would be acquired by the price support agency.
3. A decline of 10 per cent in the value of agricultural exports
would tend to reduce the average level of farm prices by 1.4 per
cent. Or, if prices were rigidly maintained, about .9 per cent
(1.4/1.66) of total farm marketirigs would be acquired .by. the price.
support agency.
Relationships of this sort also figure prominently in the. analysis
of price support programs for individual commodities. Chart 3
shows a simple demand and supply structure roughly applicable to
certain crops, including potatoes. In this structure, it is assumed
that the crop has already been planted and production is either
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fully determined and ready for market or is subject to further in-
fluence only by noneconomic factors such as weather. With minor
qualifications, the entire production of the crop is moved through
the marketing system to the retail store (and restaurant) level. The
main determinants of retail price for such a commodity, based on
statistical and economic evidence, are the supply available for con-
sumption and the disposable income of consumers. Marketing mar-
CHART 3
Demand and Supply Structure for Perishable Crops
(supply predetermined; single market)
Arrows show direction of influence. Heavy arrows indicate major paths of influence which
account for the bulk of the variation in current prices. Light dashed arrows
poths of negligible, doubtful, or occasional importance.
Source: U. S. Department ot Agriculture.
ginsare assumed to be established by competition between market-
ing agencies, and the farm price is equal to the retail price minus
marketing charges. The impact of changes in other parts of the
economy would come primarily through the disposable consumer
income variable, and to a lesser extent through such changes in wage
rates and material costs as might occur within the marketing sys-
tem. The acreage planted to the crop in the subsequent year would
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current crop; variations in weather would have an important bearing
upon the actual production inthe next year.
Chart 4 shows a simplified demand and supply structure for ex-
port crops such as wheat, cotton,, and tobacco. If we consider a point
in time at which the current production of cotton in the United
States and in foreign countries has been determined, the farm
CHART 4
Demand and Supply Structure for Export Crops
Consumer



































Arrows show direction of influence. l-1eavy arrows indicate major paths of influence which account for the
bulk of Ihe variation in current prices. Light solid arrows indicate definite but less important paths;
dashed arrows indicate paths involving more remote variables.
Source: U. S. Deportment of Agriculture.
priceof United States cotton (in the absence of price supports) will
be determined by the level of demand in the United States and
also in other countries. As indicated by the column of boxeson the
right-hand side of this chart, foreign demand for United States cot-
ton is not entirely independent of the major domestic demand fac-
tors. There are, of course, other factors affecting foreign demand
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which are wholly independent of income changes in
States
the United
'While the demand and supply structures for export crops would
be complicated enough under a system of international free trade,
for many years export demand has also been subject to disturbances
CHART 5
Demand and Supply Structure for Feed Grains
for the bulk of the variatLon in current prices.
portant paths; dashed arrows indicate paths of
Current price.
Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture
indicate major paths of influence which account
Light solid arrows indicate definte but less im—
negligible importonce in the determination of
because of government actions. It is worth noting that producers of
the major United States export crops—cotton, wheat, and tobacco—
have been among the strongest advocates of government price sup-
port programs. The combination of major uncertainties and arbi-
trary elements in export demand, coupled with highly inelastic de-
mands for domestic consumption, made prices of these commodities
inherently lessstable and predictable than those of many other
farm products after 1933.
Chart 5 shows a simplified demand and supply structure for an-
31$
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other commodity group which has figured prominently in our price
support program—corn and other feed grains. Normally only 3
or 4 per cent of our feed grains is exported, and more than 90
per cent of our production is consumed by domestic livestock. In.
turn, our livestock products are almost wholly consumed in this.
country, neither exports nor imports being of great quantitative
importance.
The impacts of changes in ecpnomic activity, are transmitted into
the feed grain economy via disposable income, retail prices of
livestock products, and charges on
livestock products, and thence to the farm prices of livestock prod-
ucts, which influence the demand for feed grains. The other main
factors influencing farm prices of feed grains are weather, carry-
over stocks, and the numbers of grain-consuming livestock on hand.
The resulting price of feed grains influences the quantity of feed
grains fed to livestock and the number of livestock which are pro-
duced or carried over into the following season.
The information contained in the above diagram could also be
expressed in terms of a set of structural equations.7 For practical
applications, we would have to estimate the numerical coefficient
related to each of the arrows or lines of influence; where relevant,
we would also have to estimate or specify the time lags involved.
Chart 6 shows a diagram for corn with the relevant numerical co-
efficients added, but without any specification of the time lags
which are particularly important in the area of livestock production
and prices. The right-hand side of this chart also suggests how a
price support and storage program for corn operates to reduce
fluctuations in production and prices in other sectors of the live-
stock and feed economy.
Farm price support programs attempt to avert the "normal"
consequences of free market demand and supply structures such as
those illustrated above. They act to maintain farm prices and cash
farm income in the face of adverse changes in either supply or
demand conditions. How they affect the nonfarm economy through
the maintenance of farm income has been discussed earlier.. Other,
effects, and perhaps important ones, radiate from the stabilization
of farm prices themselves, which creates some pressure to main-
tain retail food prices and wage rates. Analysis of these effects would
require a model of the economy more complex that any I have had
Sucha set is given in Richard J. Foote, "A Four-Equation Model of the
Livestock-Feed Economy and Its Endogenous Mechanism," Journal of Farm:
Economics, February 1953, pp. . .
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an Opportunity to work with. Some first steps toward such a model
are presented later in this paper
CHART 6






° Tn absence of price support. May be reduced considerably by pnce support and storage.
Arrows show direction of ,.nfluence. Figures represent.percent change in the 'influenced" variable
:typicany associated with I percent change in the
SOurce: U. S. Department of Agriculture.
2.Farm Price and Income Supports as Defenses against Depression
In the preceding section we have described the relative economic
size of agriculture and some of its major interrelationships with the
rest of the economy. The farm price support program in 1953
rectly involved commodities accounting for less than half of




The pricç support program now in effect8 and applicable to crops
produced in 1954 may be summarized as follows: The six so-called
basic commodities—cotton, wheat, corn, tobacco, rice, and peanuts—
are required to be supported by means of nonrecourse loans at 90
per cent of parity through the 1954 crop year. Parity prices for wheat,
corn, cotton, and peanuts are equal to their average prices during
As of May 1954.
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1909—1914 multiplied by the current level of an index of prices
paid by farmers (including interest and taxes) on a 1910—1914
base. For rice and tobacco and for nearly allnonbasic commodi-
ties, the parity price is calculated by dividing the most recent
ten-year-average price of the commodity by the index of prices re-
ceived by farmers for all commodities during the same period, and
multiplying the result by the index of prices paid by farmers (in-
cluding interest, taxes, and farm wage rates), again on a 19 10-1914
base. This is the so-called new or modernized parity formula. If
applied to every commodity, the average level of modernized
parities would be identical with the average level obtained by use
of the old parity formula (except for slight changes in the prices-
paid index, such as the inclusion of farm wage rates); but the new
and old parity prices for individual commodities differ, sometimes by
substantial percentages.9
In 1953, cash receipts from the six basic commodities totaled $7.7
billion, or 25 per cent of total farm cash receipts (Table 7).
There is a second group of commodities for which price support
is also mandatory. The "designated nonbasic commodities" include
9A specimen calculation for wheat as of April 1954 may clarify the difference
between"old" and modernized parity prices. The oldparityis calculated as
follows:
Item Unit Amount
1. Average price of wheat, August 1909—July
1914 Do!. per bu. .884
2. Prices paid, interest, and taxes, April 1954 1910—1914 =100283
3. Old parity (equals item 1 times item 2) Do!. per bu. 2.50
In contrast, modernized parity is calculated as follows:
Item Unit Amount
1. Average price of wheat, 1944—1953 Dol. per bu. 1.93
2. Prices received by farmers, all commodities,
1944—1953 1910—1914 =100256
3.Adjusted base price (equals item 1 divided
by item 2) Dol. per bu. .754
4.Prices paid, interest, taxes, and farm wage
rates, April 1954 1910—1914 =100283
5. Modernized parity(equals item 3 times
item 4) Dol. per bu. 2.13
As the index of prices received is essentially a weighted average of price rela-
tives (1944-1953 as a per cent of 1910—1914) for individual commodities, an
appropriately weighted average of all the "adjusted base prices" should be pre-
cisely 1/2.56 of the 1944—1953 prices-received index; But this is identical with
the index number base, formed of actual 1910—1914 prices.
Hence the average level of modernized parities differs from the average level of
old parities only when, and to the extent that, the inclusion of farm wage rates
changes the parity index used. As of April 1954 the two parity indexes happened
to be identical at 288. In July 1954 the parity index including wage rates was
again at 283, but the index excluding wage rates had declined to 280.
818TABLE 7
Commodities for Which Direct Price Support Programs Were
in Effect in 1953, and Their Relative Importance in Terms of
Cash Receipts from Farm Marketings
CASH RECEIPTS, 1953
MillionsPer Cent
COMMODITY of Dollarsof Total
Basic commodities $ 7,71424.9%






Designated nonbasic commodities 4,41914.3
Dairy products 4,269 13.8
Wool 129 .4
Mohair b
Tung nuts 10 b
Honey C





Dry edible beans 156 .5
Flaxseed 143 .5
Sorghum grain 103 .3
Rye 21 .1
Hairy vetch seed 4 b
Common rye grass seed 5 b
Crimson clover seed . '3 b
Wild winter peas 1 b
Naval stores c c
Totalprice-supported commodities $13,93745.0%
Cash receipts from all farm marketings$30,975100.0%
Support extended directly to milk for manufacturing only.
b Less than .5 per cent.
CWhilethe price of this commodity is supported, no data are available on cash
receipts.
dairy products, wool, mohair, tung nuts, and honey. Dairy products
are required to be supported at such 'evels between 75 and 90 per
cent of parity as will insure an adequate supply. Wool is to be sup-
ported at 90 per cent of parity until United States production of
shorn wool reaches a level of 860 million pounds. It seems unlikely
that this level will be reached for many years. The other three
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commodities are minor in terms of the cash farm income involved.
In 1953, cash receipts for this group of commodities amounted to
$4.4 billion, or about 14 per cent of total farm cash receipts. Dairy
products alone accounted for almost $4.8 billion of the total for
this group.
During 1953 a number of other nonbasic commodities were ac-
corded price support. Under the law the Secretary of Agriculture
may elect to support these and other nondesignated nonbasic corn-
modities at any level from 0 to 90 per cent of parity. The most im-
portant price-supported commodities in this category during 1953
were the oilseeds (soybeans, cottonseed, and flaxseed) and the
minor feed grains (oats, barley, and sorghum grains). In 1953,
cash receipts from the three oilseeds totaled $1.1 billion; cash re-
ceipts from the three minor feed grains totaled $.5 billion. Rye, dry
edible beans, naval stores, and a number of grass and cover crop
seeds also received price support in 1953. The nonbasic commodi-
ties (other .than "designated") which were supported in 1953 ac-
counted for $1.8 billion, or 6 per cent of total cash farm income.
Altogether, commodities which received direct price support in
1953 accounted for $13.9 billion, or 45 per cent of total cash receipts
from farm marketings. The remaining commodities, accounting for
55 per cent of cash receipts ($17 billion), were not directly sup-
ported. It could be argued that fluid milk should be added to the
list of commodities not directly supported, as dairy price support
operations were confined to manufactured products.
EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF OTHER FARM PROGRAMS
Marketing Agreements and Orders. During 1953 some twenty-
four federal marketing agreements and orders were in effect for com-
modities other than fluid milk. Federal marketing orders were ap.
plied to a number of tree fruits and nuts grown in the Pacific Coast
states and to a few other commodities produced in small geographi-
cal areas. In general, such orders provide for regulation of the grades
or qualities of the products which can be sold in primary commercial
channels. Remaining portions of the crops are directed into process-
ing outlets or surplus pools which typically yield lower returns than
do the primary markets. No' comprehensive study of the effects of
these programs on farm income is available. However, commodities
other than fluid milk subject to marketing orders in 1953 accounted
for approximately $.8 billion of (1952) cash receipts from farm
marketings. '
Inaddition, some forty-nine federal milk marketing orders were in
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effect during 1953. The volume of milk subject to these orders
amounted to 25.9 billion pounds in 1953 and returned milk producers
a cash income of approximately $1.2 billion. The fluid milk prices
maintained under federal orders are frequently linked to prices of
manufactured dairy products; in some markets various other supply,
cost, and demand factors are also considered. In addition to the fed-
eral marketing orders, some states have milk control laws of their
own. The bargaining strength of milk producers' associations also in-
fluences local prices of fluid milk. No estimates of the income effects
of federal milk marketing orders are available.
Section 32 Activities. During 1952 the Department of Agriculture
•spent $74.7 million to purchase surplus commodities for use in school
lunch and other domestic programs or to cover export payments
(subsidies) and other incentives to divert products from normal
domestic markets. These so-called Section 32 (of the Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1938) activities are financed each year out of 80
per cent of the general tariff revenues of the United States. During
the past five years new funds accruing under Section 32 have aver-
aged $150 million a year. An average of $95.8 million a year has
been actually used and about $300 million remained in a special
carry-over fund as of July 1, 1953.
Agricultural Conservation Program Payments. For several years
these payments, ranging roughly from $200 to 300 million annually,
have been used for soil building and soil conservation in a fairly strict
sense. However, there has been some discussion of using these pay-
ments to secure more effective control of production under price
support programs. In this connection the ACP payments would serve
in part as compensation for income which is forgone by withdraw-
ing certain acreages from currently productive use.
During 1988—1941 an average of $319 million a year was paid to
producers of wheat, cotton, corn, rice, peanuts, tobacco, potatoes, and
a few other commodities, equivalent to some fraction of the gap be-
tween the parity price value of those commodities and the market
price value actually received by farmers. The ACP payments began
as rewards for keeping land out of production, but as economic pres-
sures eased they were gradually focused upon, and largely confined
to, rewards for soil conservation and soil building. There is always
the possibility, however, that the amount of such payments will
again be increased as an aid, to production control in case of large
supplies or a recession in demand.
Sugar Act. Growers of sugar beets and sugar cane, products ac-
counting for $189 and 53 million of cash farm income respectively in
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1953, benefit from a special program operated under the Sugar Act
of 1948. The price objective under the Sugar Act is not related to
parity. In the event of a recession it seems likely that the Sugar Act
would continue to operate to restrict imports and maintain prices to
domestic growers at a higher level than would otherwise be the case.
RELATED FACTS
The preceding paragraphs give only a broad outline of the price
support and related programs. There are a number of real or poten-
tial qualifications and hazards which are a part of the over-all price
support picture. Among them are those described below.
Limitations on the Borrowing Authority of the Commodity Credit
Corporation. From 1945 through 1949 the CCC was authorized to
own, or extend credit on, a maximum of $4,750 million worth of corn-
modifies at any given time. Any losses realized in one year, however,
were supposed to be made up by appropriation from the Treasury
during the following year.
•In June 1950 the CCC's borrowing authority was raised to $6,750
million. Actual commitments of the CCC totaled $4.3 billion in
February 1950, and there appeared to be a distinct hazard that
favorable yields on the 1950 crops would force the CCC either to
exceed its mandatory borrowing authority or to default on its man-
datory price support program. This same problem arose again in
January 1954, and the President was obliged to request an increase
in the CCC's borrowing authority to $8.5
10Thisincrease was approved on March 20, 1954. On August 18, Congress
authorized a further increase, to $10 billion. CCC borrowing authority has been
raised several times since 1938, as follows:
CCC Borrowing
Authority
Date of Change (millions of dollars)
March 8, 1938 $500
March 4, 1939 900
August 9, 1940 1,400
July 1, 1941 2,650
July 16, 1943 3,000
April 12, 1945 4,750
June 28, 1950 6,750
March 20, 1954 8,500
August 18, 1954 10,000
Factors necessitating these increases have included (1) increases in the parity
index (of prices paid by farmers), (2) increases in the percentage of parity at
which loans were required to be set, and (3) expansions in the number of com-
modities supported. The physical volume of the CCC's price support investment
in March 1954 was only moderately higher than in (say) 1941—1942, but the
dollar-and-cents loan rates at which current stocks were acquired were two to
three times as high as those prevailing during the 1939—1942 stock build-up.
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So far Congress has raised the CCC's borrowing authority when-
ever price support commitments threatened to exceed it. But there
is always a chance that the request for an increase, by dramatizing
the size of commodity investments and potential losses, may lead to
retrenchment in price support and marketing quota levels in subse-
quent years.
Storage Charges Borne by Growers. Market prices of grains and
some other storable commodities often fall considerably below the
announced loan rate early in the marketing year. This reflects the
fact that growers receive the full loan rate only if they turn their
crops over to the CCC at a specified time late in the marketing year.
Growers must bear the cost of storing and handling their grain up
to this point. On this count alone, growers would be just as well off
selling their wheat or corn 10 cents below the loan rate at harvest
time rather than holding it for the full loan rate several months later.
Certain other cost and convenience factors may lead grain producers
to accept still further discounts below the loan rate during the
height of the harvest season.
Price Limitations on Release of CCC Stocks. However, in some
years or parts of years, the effect of the price support program is to
raise market prices several per cent above the announced loan rates.
This is because the CCC is prohibited from releasing its inventories
in normal commercial channels at a price less than 5 per cent above
the current loan rate plus reasonable carrying charges. When de-
mand exceeds commercial supplies (and grower-owned supplies
under loan), this provision means that purchasers must pay prices
5 to 10 per cent above the loan rate to acquire these commodities
from the CCC. (Commodities under loan may be redeemed by the
grower at any time. Ordinarily this will be advantageous whenever
the market price rises even slightly above the loan rate. The more
stringent price provision mentioned above applies to commodities
which are owned by the CCC, having been turned over to the Cor-
poration by growers in satisfaction of their nonrecourse loans.)
Special Hazards. Grain producers must place their commodities in
approved types of storage facilities before they are eligible for CCC
loans. During the summer of 1953 many growers were unable to find
approved storage for their wheat at harvest time and took discounts
of as much as 50 cents a bushel below the loan rate.
Another hazard applicable to storable crops is the possibility that
growers will refuse to vote marketing quotas into effect on the sub-
sequent crop. If this occurs, the mandatory price support level is
dropped to 50 per cent of parity, which for most growers of most
basic crops would be a punitive level. If this possibility is taken
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seriously, many growers, dealers, and storage operators will be re-
luctant to own and hold the commodity. The resulting pressure to
sell results not only in larger quantities going under loan but also in
more sales at substantial discounts below the loan rate.
Highlights on Acreage Allotments and Marketing Quotas. Acreage
allotments and marketing quotas are an essential part of the price
support program for basic crops. The Secretary of Agriculture is re-
quired to announce acreage allotments for most of these crops every
year except under emergency conditions. The level at which acreage
allotments are set depends upon the relationship of supply to ex-
pected demand for the commodity in question. When acreage allot-
ments are in effect, the individual grower must comply with them
in order to be eligible for price support. Many producers elect not
to comply with acreage allotments, relying on the "umbrella effect"
provided by those who do. When the market price begins to sag,
eligible producers put sufficient quantities under loan to keep the
market price from falling very far below the loan level. The pro-
ducer who is ineligible for direct price support is enabled to sell his
commodity for a few cents less than the loan rate and, at the same
time, to avoid production restrictions.
When supplies of basic crops exceed certain levels, marketing
quotas are invoked in addition to acreage allotments. Marketing
quota legislation provides severe economic penalties for noncom-
pliance. Thus marketing quotas are quite effective in limiting total
plantings of a commodity to the desired area. They may be evaded
somewhat in spirit by producers selecting their best land and using
heavier fertilizer applications and other practices calculated to raise
yields above the previous norm. But these efforts seldom offset more
than a fraction of the effects of acreage reduction during the first
year or two of a marketing quota program.
PROBABLE OPERATION OF PRESENT PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM
DURING A SEVERE RECESSION1'
It will be noted from the preceding section that a large part of the
total price support activity under the present program is directed
toward storable crops, particularly wheat, cotton, and feed grains.
Once a fixed dollar-and-cents price support has been announced, the
volume of price support activity on the forthcoming crop will de-
pend upon variations in yield, variations in the foreign supply and
demand situation, variations in domestic demand, and minor dis—
turbing factors which are not separately measurable.
11. The recession model described in the following pages 13 not a forecast. It is
for illustrative purposes only.
324FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS
Year-to-year fluctuations in crop yields, due mainly to weather,
often overshadow the effects of year-to-year changes in consumer de-
mand. Chart 7 summarizes variations in yields of wheat, corn, and





















Variations in Adjusted Crop Yields
Yields adjusted roughly to 1952 conditions by averaging: (I) actual deviations from 9-year moving
averages, centered and (2) percentage deviations applied to 1952 goal yields.
Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture.
charts would represent per acre yields of 14 to 15 bushels of wheat,
38 bushels of corn, and 280 pounds of cotton. The larger yield devia-
tions for these crops exceed 10 per cent, and in a few cases 20 per
cent, of the trend yield. A large part of the CCC stock build-up from
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ton in 1948, and above-average yields also in 1949. High yields have
also contributed to the stock build-up currently taking place.
Sudden changes in export demand also contributed substantially
to the current stock build-up and to that of 1939—1942. If such
changes, or high crop yields, happen to coincide with an economic
recession, there is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the re-
cession itself as a factor in the accumulation of price support stocks.
Such a coincidence, as during 1948—1950, leads in turn to an over-
estimate of the contribution of the price support program to off-
setting the effectsofrecesgion. While CCC inventories and loans
outstanding increased $2% billion from June 1948 to February 1950,
at least half of the rise was due to factors other than the reces-
sion.
How would the present price support. program operate during a
severe economic recession? In the following hypothetical illustration
we shall abstract from reality in a number of respects: (1) we as-
sume average weather in each year involved in the projection—
hence average crop yields except for possible effects of the price
support program itself; (2) we assume no sharp changes in the
production of crops in foreign countries or in the level of demand in
foreign countries except changes reasonably related to a domestic
economic recession; and (3) we assume that price support commit-
ments will be continued for the same commodities and at the same
percentages of parity throughout the recession as at the time of its
assumed beginning in January of a given year.12
The setting is as follows: Because of the forward-pricing provi-
sions of the price support law, the minimum dollar-and-cents loan
rates for crops in any given year are mostly announced by February
of that year and remain in effect until the spring or summer of the
following year. Marketing quotas and acreage allotments where ap-
plicable are also announced annually by February. With respect to
price-supported crops for which no acreage allotments or marketing
quotas are announced, farmers will largely have made their planting
decisions by February or March. The price support level for dairy
products must be announced sometime before April 1 each year. In
the current projection we make an assumption which is not true to
fact—we assume that dairy price supports are extended at 90 per
12Thefollowing analysis was prepared early in 1954 and was intended to
throw light on the issues confronting economists and legislators at that time. Some
of the issues were at least temporarily resolved by passage of the Agricultural
Act of 1954 in August of that year. However, the main features of the analysis
would be unchanged if the hypothetical recession were assumed to begin in 1956
or any other year subsequent to
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cent of parity, the level which applied as of January in the first
recession year.'3
Thus as of January or February, when the recession is assumed to
begin, price support commitments are laid out rigidly for a period
extending twelve to eighteen months into the future. Now let us con-
sider the recession's impact on this program. The economic frame-
work for this hypothetical recession is shown in Table 8. It is about
TABLE 8
Projections of Employment, Income, and Prices during a Hypothetical Severe Recession
.
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Disposable personal income Bil. do!.




















[ndustrial production 1947—1949 =100
consumer price index 1947—1949 =100
parity index 1910—1914 =100



















a Thisis not a forecast, but an assumption made for illustrative purposes. The projections are
based on a sharp decline in employment and a rise in unemployment to around 8 to 9 million
in the second year of recession. The workweek is shortened considerably to reflect the
lisappearance of overtime work as well as a reduction of the standard workweek in some indus-
iies. Little change in output per man-hour is assumed. With reduced employment, a considerable
lrop is projected for real output, the price level, and consumer incomes.
b Including armed forces overseas.
as severe a recession as seems within the range of possibility, in view
of the variOus built-in stabilizers in the economy today and the
greater readiness of government to engage in countercyclical action.
The main reason for assuming such a severe recession is to make the
net influence of domestic demand factors stand out more clear4j over
other factors and disturbances which might largely overshadow the
effects of a more moderate decline in domestic demand. Certain key
variables which influence the demand for farm products or (as in
Dairy products were supported at 90 per cent of parity for two years prior to
April 1, 1954. Although supports were lowered to 75 per cent of parity by the
Secretary as of April 1, there was a strong drive in Congress as late as August
1954 to restore them, by law, to at least 85 per cent of parity. The 90 per cent
level was assumed here because it was still in effect'as of January 1954 and be-
cause it had been associated for some time, in fact and in spirit, with the 90 per
cent support prices for basic crops.
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the case of the prices-paid index) the level at which price supports
must be set for crops in the second recession year are shown in
Table 9.
We shall abstract from current reality in another respect also. We
shall assume that, just before the onset of the recession, supplies
and demands for all commodities are the same both with and with-
out a price support program. For commodities eligible for direct
TABLE 9
Projections of Industrial Output, Disposable Income, and Prices Paid by Farmers
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a Thisis not a forecast, but an assumption made for illustrative purposes. Figures are largel)
straight-line interpolations from those shown in Table 8.
price support, this means that, at the beginning of the recession, we
assume supply and demand to be in balance precisely at the price
support level. The purpose of this assumption isto emphasize
changes in farm prices and incomes during the assumed recession,
without regard for differences in the prerecession levels of farm
prices and incomes which might have resulted from the presence or
absence of price support programs.
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In making the farm price, production, and income projections sum-
marized below, I have tried to estimate for each major commodity or
commodity group the prices and rates of production which would
result from the assumed decline in consumer income and from the
interaction of livestock and feed prices. Time lags in the adjust-
ment of livestock and crop production were taken into account com-
modity by commodity. In estimating these price and production
changes, statistical demand and supply relationships were exten-
sively used, but with coefficients rounded to one or at most two sig-
nificant figures. The projections as a whole are partly plastic or in-
tuitive—they are not precisely defined by a set of structural equa-
tions, although the equations implied in the results could be written
out.
The over-all results of the projections just described are shown in
Table 10. The main reasons for differences with and without price
supports are summarized below.
Marketings. With no supports the only change allowed for in the
volume of farm marketings is a moderate increase in marketings of
cattle. This reflects an expectation that cattlemen would try to move
their stock and reduce their inventories more rapidly in the face of
declining prices for cattle than if cattle prices remained stable. With
prices of all farm products falling freely in response to declining
demand, there would be little incentive to shift the pre-recession
pattern of production and little opportunity to leave the farm for
nonfarm employment. Total agricultural production would be main-
tained at about the pre-recession level.
With supports at fixed percentages of parity under storable crops
and dairy products, but not under poultry, eggs, or meat animals,
marketings of cattle might increase by January, second year of reces-
sion, to about the same extent and for the same reasons as they would
if no other commodities were supported. In addition, the price sup-
ports for dairy products would encourage some increase in milk
production as competing livestock enterprises became less and less
profitable. Production and marketings of crops could not be reduced
before about July of the second year of recession. The figures shown
for July, second year of recession, and January, third year of reces-
sion, assume that acreages of basic crops in the second year of reces-
sion are reduced by the following percentages through the imposi-
tion of marketing quotas: wheat 10 per cent, cotton 15 per cent, to-
bacco 10 per cent, rice 20 per cent, and peanuts 10 per cent. It is
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of acreage diverted from the basic crops. As a result, a large share of
the "diverted acreage" is assumed, on the basis of past experience,
to go into feed grains, oilseeds, hay, and pasture.
It is assumed that acreage allotments (but not marketing quotas)
would be applied to corn in the commercial area at about the same
level and with the same limited success as in recent years. Within
the commercial area the acreage of corn for harvest in the first year
of recession would be about 5 million acres lower than in the year
before. However, much of this acreage would be expected to go into
soybeans, oats, hay, and pasture, and corn acreage itself would be
expected to increase somewhat outside the commercial corn area as
a result of the reduction in wheat and cotton acreage. The net result
would be little change in total feed grain production and marketings
in the first two years of recession from levels in the year before its
onset.
As of January, third year of recession, the projections under the
present price support program assume cutbacks from January, first
year of recession, of around 5percent in production and marketings
of hogs, eggs, and turkeys and about 8 per cent in chickens and
broilers. However, milk production in January, third year of reces-
sion, is assumed to be 5 per cent higher than two years earlier. The
aggregate volume of farm marketings as of the same date is esti-
mated to be only 2 to 2% per cent smaller than it would have been
in the absence of price supports and acreage restrictions. An addi-
tional reduction of about 1 per cent might be obtained if acreages
diverted from basic crops could be kept out of currently productive
uses. However, a really tight program to control diverted acres
might require sizable conservation, rental, or benefit payments to
the farmers affected.
Prices. With no supports, farm prices are estimated to fall 15 per
cent during the first year of the recession. The bulk of this drop rep-
resents the direct effect of the assumed 10 per cent drop in disposable
income upon domestic consumer demand. This effect is assumed to
be somewhat augmented (1) by a weakening in commercial storage
demand and in the reservation demands of farmers for storable
crops and for livestock, particularly feeder cattle and cattle to main-
tain or augment breeding herds, and (2) by a contraction in foreign
demand for our export crops. This explicitly assumes that a severe
recession in the United States would have serious effects on the
•economies of many other countries. The further decline in disposable
income during the second year of recession is estimated to result in a
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farm price level as of January, third year of recession, fully 20 per
cent lower than that at the beginning of the recession.
With price supports at constant percentages of parity on storable
crops and dairy products, a smaller, but still substantial, decline in
average farm prices is indicated—between 10 and 11 per cent dur-
ing the first year of recession. Up to that time, prices of meat ani-
mals, poultry and eggs, fruits and vegetables, and some other corn-
modifies not directly supported would fall much the same as if there
were no price supports for other commodities. Prices of storable
crops are assumed to rest more heavily on, or sag further below, their
respective support prices as a result of the decline in demand. Under
recession conditions it appears likely that stocks of wheat, feed
grains, and possibly cotton would increase during the first crop year
after the onset of the depression. For various reasons, market prices
of grains sag below supports when CCC stocks are building up,
although in some cases they exceed the loan leyels during periods
when demand is strong enough to draw supplies out of CCC owner-
ship.
During the second recession year, some delayed effects of the
price support program for feed grains begin to show up in livestock
prices, as a result of cutbacks in production. As of January, third
year of recession, prices of the unsupported meat animals and poultry
products are estimated to average only 16 per cent below the level
at the onset of the recession if feed grains are supported, as com-
pared with 28 per cent below if feed grains are not supported.
As of January, third year of recession, the dollar-and-cents levels
of price supports for the eligible commodities are 5 per cent lower
than in January of the year before, reflecting the same percentage
drop in the index of prices paid by farmers (the so-called "parity
index"). The average drop in crop prices during the first two years
of recession (including some crops not price-supported) is about
10 per cent, as contrasted with an estimated 21 or 22 per cent drop
in crop prices if supports are completely absent. For farm products
in the aggregate, the present price support program is estimated to
hold the two-year price decline to 12 per cent, as compared with
about 21 per cent in the absence of any price supports.
Cash Receipts. The cash receipts indexes are simply products of
the price and marketing indexes shown in Table 10. As of January,
third recession year, cash receipts are projected as down 14 per cent
if the. present price support program were continued as compared
with a 21 per cent drop if there were no price supports.
In terms of dollars, the present price support program is shown as
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sustaining cash receipts at an annual rate of $1.8 billion higher in Jan-
uary, second recession year, and about $2.1 billion higher as of Janu-
ary of the next year than they would be in the absence of price sup-
ports. With production expenditures probably not much different
under the two programs, the net incomes of farm families at the lat-
ter date would also be about $2 billion higher (or, more precisely,
would have dropped $2 billion less from pre-recession levels) than
in the absence of price supports. This difference would represent
roughly 20 per cent of net farm income as of January, third recession
year.
Extent of Price Support Stock Accumulations. In accomplishing
this degree of income support, the price support agency would also
significantly increase its outlays for, or investments in, price support
stocks. Using the aggregative demand relationships described earlier,
implying an elasticity of commercial utililization of farm products of
—.6, the rate of total commercial movement of farm products as of
January, third recession year, might be about 7 per cent lower with
continued supports than in the absence of a price support program.
As of the same date, however, the volume of farm marketings is
estimated to be only 2.3 per, cent lower than in the absence of a
price support program; hence nearly 5 per cent of the volume of
farm marketings at that time would be going into price support
stocks. At the loan rates then existing, this would represent an
accumulation of a little less than $1 %billion(annual-rate basis)
during the second and third depression years.
Considering only the cutback in commercial use relative to total
marketings, price support stocks might increase less than 1/2billion
dollars as of July, first recession year, compared with the level which
would have been attained if no recession had begun. An additional
billion dollars might be added to stocks out of the year's crop and
as much as $11/2 billion more during the next crop year. The cumula-
tive increase in price support investments during the first two reces-
sion years might well exceed $2% billion.
If supplies just before the beginning of an assumed recession were
about average, a sizable stock pickup by the CCC might be realized
as of July, first recession year. This would result from private firms'
and individuals' cutting their holdings of storable commodities from
a relatively easy level down to minimum working stocks. As a con-
sequence, the net increase in price support stocks might substantially
exceed the net increase in total stocks, price support and other com-
bined. No allowance is made for such a shift in the present esti-
mates because owners, fearing the burdensome surpluses already
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on hand, have already made this transfer. If we assumed a recession
to begin at a time when commercial stocks were normal, the net
shift of the storage burden from commercial to CCC hands could
well amount to $1 billion.
EFFECFSOF PRESENT FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM ON
GENERAL ECONOMIC STABILITY DURING A SEVERE RECESSION
If we were simply interested in estimating the effects of a severe
recession upon farm prices and farm income, we could, for most
practical purposes, stop at this point. Obviously, a price support
program of the present type affects the time path of farm prices and
incomes during a recession. But what does a farm price support pro-
gram contribute, directly or indirectly, to stability in the remainder
of the economy? This is a more difficult question, to which I have
never seen a well-reasoned quantitative answer.
I am not sure that I have a satisfactory answer myself. But I be-
lieve I can lay out some of the relevant considerations, and perhaps I
can give a rough idea of the effect of the present farm price support
program upon various economic magnitudes.
Chart 8 shows some of the major lines along which a price sup-
port program would affect other parts of the economy. The coeffi-
cient beside each arrow represents the estimated percentage change
in the variable to which the arrow points that is associated with a 1
per cent change in the variable from which the arrow leads. Most
of these "path coefficients" are based upon known factors, such as the
weights of particular components of official index numbers, or the
coefficients of statistical demand functions. Others seem reasonable
to me but could be checked by empirical analysis. One coefficient
assumes a "multiplier" of 2, based on studies by A. R. Smithies and
others. One coefficient operates with a time lag. Values of the three
coefficients marked with asterisks are pure assumptions on my part.
As indicated, the farm price support program has three immedi-
ate effects: (1) it raises the average level of prices received by
farmers; (2) it reduces farm output, at least after the first twelve
months of recession; and (3) it reduces the commercial utilization
of farm products.
Suppose, for example, that the direct effect of a price support pro-
gram is to increase farm prices by 10 per cent, If marketing margins
remain constant, this will increase retail food prices about 5 per cent.
Because retail food prices carry a weight of 30 per cent in the con-
sumer price index, that index will rise 1.5 per cent.
The "influence" of the consumer price index upon wage rates is
334FARM SUPPORT PROCRAMS
based on plue assumption. This index figures in some important
wage contracts, and it is widely used as a talking point in wage dis-
putes. The coefficient in Chart 8 implies that a 1.5 per cent increase
in the consumer price index would have the effeôt of maintaining
wage rates 1 pei cent higher than they would otherwise have been.
The influences of wage rates upon gross national product and
CHART 8
Lines of Influence of Present Farm Price Support Program
on Various Economic Magnitudes
upon the retail prices of nonfood products also rest on assumption.
(The latter coefficient assumes that wages constitute about 50 per
cent of value added in manufacturing and distributing processes,
and that most nonfarm prices are administered in such a way that
these direct wage costs are covered, even during a recession.)
Chart 8 implies that the initial or direct increase in the consumer
price index generates a further increase in the same index. An in-
crease in the consumer price index increases wage rates, which in-
Numbers beside arrows are multipliers applicable to percentage changes in variable from which arrow
leeds. Those marked * ore assumed without empirical check.
a Operates with time log of one year. b Assumes "multiplier" of 2.0
Source: U.S. Deportment of Agriculture.FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS
crease nonfood prices, which enter the consumer price index with
a weight of 70 per cent. Hence the total effect upon the consumer
price index of an increase in farm prices consists of the direct influ-
ence plus this "feed-back" effect.
An initial increase of 10 per cent in prices received by farmers
leads directly, through prices of purchased livestock, feed, and food
products, to something like a 1.5 per cent increase in the index of
prices paid by farmers. There is also an indirect effect operating
through the consumer price index, wage rates, and retail prices of
nonfood products. This effect is only about a fourth as large as the
direct one.
The dotted arrow running from "prices paid" to "farm prices" re-
flects use of the prices-paid index as a basis for setting price sup-
ports. Because such supports are announced in advance of the plant-
ing season, this coefficient operates with a time lag of one year. Un-
der the present price support program the direct influence of a 1
per cent increase in the prices-paid index would apply to products
accounting for only 45 per cent of cash farm income; hence the direct
effect on the average level of all farm prices would be only .45 per
cent. The coefficient of .67 shown in Chart 8 allows for the influence
of price support levels for feed grains upon the unsupported prices
of meat animals, poultry, and eggs.
Chart 8 also shows three chains of influence of price supports
upon disposable personal income, particularly that of nonfarm
persons. An increase in disposable income raises prices of those
farm products which are not supported and whose market supplies
at any given time are fixed; it also increases commercial utilization
(but not prices) of farm products which are in surplus at their
applicable support prices. The direct effect of the farm price support
program in raising the disposable income of farm operators is not
adequately allowed for in Chart 8.
The net increase in CCC stocks as a result of the price support
program represents an injection of money from outside the private
economy. It is equivalent to a purchase of goods by the federal gov-
ernment, with no simultaneous increase in government revenue.
In Chart 8 we apply a multiplier of 2 to the annual rate of increase
in CCC price support stocks.
The model in Chart 8 contains a number of implicit "path-multi-
pliers." If we follow the arrow from farm prices through the con-
sumer price index and back through disposable personal income to
farm prices, we find that the initial increase in farm prices generates
a secondary increase 4.2 per cent as large as the first one. The see-
236FARM PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAMS
ondary increase would generate a third-order increase, and so on.
Using a well-known formula for the sum of a power series, the final




or 1.044 per cent.
Some minor additional effects of the same sort are found if we
consider the secondary "loops" centering around the consumer price
index and disposable personal income. The chain of influences from
farm prices through prices paid by farmers and back again involves
a similar power series, but with a time lag of one year between the
change in prices paid and the next-order change in farm prices. The
effects of the price support program upon farm output (by means of
acreage restrictions) and upon the net increase in CCC price sup-
port stocks may be additive to the initial effect of the program upon
farm prices and may not involve power series multipliers.
In a stationary equilibrium, effect of the one time
lag in the system, it appears that if the existing price support pro-
gram initially or directly increased farm prices by 10 per cent the
result would be a final level of farm prices about 12.3 per cent higher
than it would have been in the absence of a price support program.
(This figure depends, of course, on the coefficients in Chart 8 and
would be altered if some of these coefficients were revised.)
Table 11 shows the numerical results obtained by applying the
coefficients in Chart 8 to the initial price and quantity data given in
Table 10 (or underlying it). The estimated decline in farm prices
from January, first recession year, to January, third recession year,
is only half as large as the decline experienced in the absence of
price supports. As of January, third recession year, farm prices with
the present support program are shown as 13 per cent higher than
farm prices without support. The index of prices paid by farmers
is indicated to be more than 2 per cent higher as a result of the price
support program. This would mean a roughly similar increase in
production expenditures and a corresponding reduction in the net
income differences resulting from the farm prices shown. The parity
ratio is shown as declining toin the absence of price support, and
as leveling out at 86 under the present program. The slight increase
in the parity ratio with price support as of January, third recession
year, reflects the delayed action of feed grain supports upon live-
stock production and prices. The consumer price index is shown as
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2% or 3 per cent higher with the price support program than
without it.
TABLE11
EstimatedValues of Selected Economic Magnitudes during a Hypothetical Severe Recession
(1) with No Farm Price Supports and (2) with Prices of Specified Commodities Supported at






















































































































a Projectionsunder present supports are based on initial estimates in Table 10 adjusted for the
assumed interaction patterns shown in Chart 8.
b Prices received by farmers as a percentage of prices paid by farmers.
Includes rough allowance for increase in disposable income of farm operators resulting di-
redily from price support program but not provided for in Chart 8.
We now come to two other magnitudes of central interest to eco-
nomic forecasters. As of January, third recession year, the figures in
Table 10 implied a net annual increaseCCC stocks of about $1%
billion. This effect, plus certain othçrs indicated in Chart 8, leads
to a gross national pEoduct as of January, third recession year, about
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$6 billion higher with the present price support program than with
no supports. While this is a substantial sum, it is only 8 per cent of
the assumed total decline in GNP from peak to trough in the absence
of a price support program.
Finally, as of January, third recession year, disposable income is
projected as $4 billion higher with the present price support program
than in the absence of price supports. This is a little more than 10
per cent of the estimated decline from January, first recession year,
in the absence of price support. Of the $4 billion increase, $2 billion
or more may accrue to nonfarm people, while perhaps $11/2to2
billion probably accrues to farm operators. (In terms of net farm
income before personal taxes, the price support program under exist-
ing legislationmight yield about $2 billion more at the trough of
a severe recession than would result in the absence of price sup-
port.)
Although there may be several faulty coefficients in Chart 8, and
some faulty lines of reasoning, I believe that Table 11 defines the
net effect of the present farm price support program upon the course
of an economic recession reasonably well. Under the recession pat-
tern assumed here, the present price support program might reduce
the drift in the general retail price level by as much as 30 per cent;
it might reduce the decline in GNP and disposable personal income
by something like 10 per cent; and it would reduce the drop in farm
prices (which it is specifically set up to do) by 50 per cent relative
to the level expected in the absence of a price support program.
A prolonged recession would subject the present price support
program to severe stresses. A few of the problems are summarized
below.
We have estimated that, as of January, third recession year, the
CCC would be accumulating commodity stocks at the rate of ap-
proximately $1% billion a year. In physical terms the CCC would
be picking up nearly 5 per cent of total farm output, and the price
support program might be considered out of balance to that extent.
If the economy were expected to continue at the January, third
recession year, level for some time, one alternative would be a
desperate attempt to reduce farm output by another 5 per cent.
Possible lines of attack would include (1) reducing the national
wheat acreage allotment from its present legal minimum of 55 mil-
lion acres to something less than 50 million acres, (2) complete
prohibition of currently productive use of acreages diverted from
the basic crops, and (3) establishing marketing quotas for oilseeds.
14Thisanalysis was prepared before passage of the Agricultural Act of 1954.
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But these measures could hardly be expected to reduce total farm
output by more than 3 per cent. The next 2 per cent reduction might
require programs which have been regarded as either ãdministra-
tively or politically unworkable in the past, such as (1) marketing
quotas for milk and butterfat and/or (2) marketing quotas for corn
and perhaps other feed grains.
An alternative to these ultrarestrictive measures would be to in-
crease consumption and discourage production by abandoning, or
substantially lowering, price supports for dairy products (below the
90 per cent of parity assumed in our model). A substantial lowering
of the price support level for corn and other feed grains might also
be necessary. These measures would, of course, reduce the level of
farm prices (perhaps about 5 per cent in the aggregate) and would
have some effect on the rest of the economy as indicated in Chart 8.
If price support stocks at the beginning of the recession were small,
and if definite signs of economic recovery began to appear by about
January, third recession year, the price support program might be
able topull through without resort to the tight restrictions and
the support level reductions mentioned above. But if stocks were
high at the beginning of the recession, as they are at this time, and/or
if bumper yields should occur in the first and second recession
years, not only might these two sorts of measures seem necessary,
but costly and unusual surplus disposal measures might be under-
taken and the whole price support program might be drastically
revised.
3. Effects of Alternative Farm Programs
upon General Economic Stabilitg
Two distinct sorts of questions will be considered under this head-
ing. In the first section we shall assume that each of a number of
alternative farm programs has actually been operating for a consid-
erable period before a recession begins and we shall inquire how
each program would affect the course of events during a hypotheti-
cal recession.
The second type of question is probably of much greater interest
at the time this is. written (May 1954): What would be the eco-
nomic repercussions of a shift from the present price support pro-
gram to a specified alternative program (a) if the general economy
remained stable and (b) if such a transition happened to coincide
with an economic recession? These two questions will be dealt with
in turn.
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If farm price support legislation is changed in 1954, it seems most
likely that the shift will be from the present program, with con-
tinuous support for specified commodities at 90 per cent of parity,
to some variant of the Agricultural Act of 1949. Multiple price
plans for wheat, cotton, and rice have also received considerable
attention in recent months. If multiple price plans were adopted for
one or more of these crops, it seems likely that prices of other prod-
ucts now being supported would continue to receive support either
under the present program or under some variation of the Agricul-
tural Act of 1949.
Finally, we might consider a program which has been strongly ad-
vocated by some economists and some political figures, although it
has never been used on an extensive scale under peacetime condi-
tions. This would be a program of compensatory payments on live-
stock products, coupled with the present type of price support pro-
gram on storable crops. Compensatory payments would be made
directly to livestock producers based on the difference between the
actual market price of the product and some specffied percentage of
• parity.
THEAGRICULTURAL OF 1949
Contrary to some rather widespread opinions, price supports for
most of the basic crops under the Agricultural Act of 1949 are not
low or, in most cases, extremely flexible. A prominent visual feature
of the 1949 act is a schedule of price supports, expressed as per-
centages of parity, which drops 1 point for every 2-point increase
in the ratio of actual supplies to normal supplies. This price support
schedule ranges from 90 per cent down to 75 per cent of parity.
Many persons have assumed that, if the Agricultural Act of 1949
were put into effect, prices of the six basic crops would immediately
fall to 75 per cent of parity and stay there. This is by no means the
case.
Under the 1949 act, tobacco is to be supported at 90 per cent of
parity in any year in which marketing quotas are proclaimed. And
marketing quotas must be proclaimed in any year if quotas have
been in effect during the preceding year. The effect is continuous
support for tobacco at 90 per cent of parity. Supplies of peanuts
never get very far above normal under present program operations,
as excess stocks at the end of each year are generally crushed for oil
and do not figure in the supply percentage for peanuts for direct
edible use as nuts or peanut butter. Thus price support for peanuts
would drop below 90 per cent of parity only rarely and by small
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percentages. In the 'case of cotton, even if certain special legislation
not part of the 1949 act were eliminated, the price support level
would rarely fall below 90 per cent of parity, and then, as a rule, by
rather small amounts.
The case for wheat is different. Due to an inconsistency in the
wheat legislation (which has not required correction while manda-
tory supports at 90 per cent of parity have been continued), wheat
marketing quotas would be set at a level which, with average yields,
would bring supplies in the ensuing year to a level requiring sup-
port at not less than 83 per cent of parity. If the flexible provisions of
the 1949 act should go into effect, it seems likely that the present
inconsistency would be eliminated in such a way that the object of
wheat marketing quotas in any year would be to reduce wheat sup-
plies to a level such that support at 90 per cent of parity would be-
come mandatory in the following year. The provisions for corn are
more nearly in accord with the popular conception of flexible price
supports. However, last year's record supply of corn (1953) would
have required support at not less than 82 or 83 per cent of parity.
The flexibility,whichmight be provided by large supplies result-
irig from bumper yields is at least partially thwarted by the forward-
pricing provision of the act. If a minimum dollar-and-cents support
price for corn is announced before planting time, •based on the
assumption of average yields, the support price for that crop can-
not subsequently be lowered to take account of favorable weather
and high yields.
Hence, if we assume the Agricultural Act of 1949 to be in effect
and functioning well, according to its internal logic just before the
onset of a recession, farm prices would fall only a little faster and a
little farther than under the present program of support for basic
commodities at 90 per cent of parity. Assuming that price supports
for dairy products were dropped from 90 per cent down to 75 per
cent of parity shortly after the recession began, the average level of
farm prices under the 1949 act would fall '1 per cent below the
present program results (Table 11) as of January, second recession
year, and about 2 per cent as of January, third recession year.
Marketing quotas and acreage' allotments would likely be applied at
about the same level as under the present program.
In summary, the effects of the Agricultural Act of 1949 would be
very similar to those of the program under existing legislation ex-
cept that the differences from "no program" would be only about
four-fifths as large. For example, as of January, third recession year,
the index of prices received by farmers would be estimated at about
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220 under the 1949 act, compared with 225 under the present pro-
gram and 199 in the absence of price supports.
Other differences would be roughly similar. As of January, third
recession year, cash receipts from farm marketings might be approxi-
mately $.5 billion lower under the 1949 act than under the present
program, assuming that both programs had been in operation be-
fore the beginning of the assumed recession and that they had re-
suited in precisely the same average pre-recession levels of prices,
marketings, and income.
THE PRESIDENT'S FARM PROGRAM
To a large extent, the President's farm program, as transmitted to
Congress on January 11, 1954, is designed to ease the transition from
the program now (May 1954) in effect to the Agricultural Act of
1949. Hence, over the long run, the President's program is very simi-
lar to the 1949 act and its behavior during a recession would also be
much the same.
EITHER THE PROGRAM UNDER EXISTING LEGISLATION OR THE
AGRICULTURAL OF 1949 SUPPLEMENTED BY MULTIPLE
PRICE PLANS FOR WHEAT, COTrON, AND RICE
If this combination of programs were well established before the
onset of a severe recession, the stability effects would be much like
those of the Agricultural Act of 1949. Possibly there would be no
marketing quotas on the three crops under multiple price plans; if
quotas were applied, they would probably be set at higher levels
than under the present program or the 1949 act. Market prices of
cotton and rice might decline much as they would if no price sup-
port program were in operation. The market price of wheat, how-
ever, might change only in proportion to changes in the price of
corn, which is assumed to be supported at or near 90 per cent of
its parity price. Livestock prices could be a shade lower as the
result of larger quantities of wheat-fed animals, but as an offset
somewhat larger quantities of feed grains might be picked up by
the CCC under its loan program.
The net effect of the multiple price plans would be to drop the
average level of prices received by farmers about 1 per cent as
of January, second recession year, and about 2 per cent as of Janu-
ary, third recession year. Hence if other commodities were supported
as under the present program, the farm price index as of January,
third recession year, might be around 220 or 221; if multiple price
plans were superimposed upon the Agricultural Act of 1949 for
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other commodities, the farm-price-received index as of that date
might be around 216, about two-thirds of the way from the "no
support" level toward the level expected under the present pro-
gram. However, farm output should be at least 1 per cent larger
as of January, third recession year, so that the net effect of multi-
ple price plans on the commodities specified might be to increase
the drop in cash farm income during a recession about 1 per cent,
or '4billiondollars, relative to programs which omitted the multi-
ple price feature.
COMPENSATORY PAYMENTS ON LIVESTOCK PRODUCTS
Under this program we assume that prices of basic crops are sup-
ported directly (as under the present program) at their pre-reces-
sion level, corresponding to around 90 per cent of parity. In the
case of livestock products, including milk and butterfat, we assume
that no attempt will be made to interfere with market prices, but
that, to the extent that market prices fall below the pre-recession
percentage of parity, the government will pay the difference to
livestock producers.
Under this program, farm prices would behave much as They
would under the present support program through January, second
recession year. As of July, second recession year, they would be
about midway between the present program level and the "no sup-
port" level; in January, third recession year, they would be about
one-third of the way between these two levels, but closer to the "no
support" level.
Quite obviously, this program results in a higher, and hence more
stable, level of cash income to farmers than any of the programs
previously mentioned. As of January, third recession year, this pro-
gram, including compensatory payments to producers, would re-
turn farmers nearly $4 billion more than they would receive in the
absence of price supports. Alternatively, we might say that the drop
in cash receipts from farm marketings plus compensatory payments
is only four-tenths as great under this program as it would be in the
absence of price supports.
However, the cost of the compensatory payments would be sub-
stantial. As of January, third recession year, these payments, on live-
stock products only, would be running at the rate of close to $3
billion a year. While the level of total returns maintained for live-
stock products would encourage a heavier consumption of feed
grains and considerably reduce the CCC's pickup of feed crops, the
CCC would vcry likely still be picking up half a billion dollars'
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worth of other commodities (annual rate) as of January, third
cession year.
The multiplier effect of compensatory payments plus net CCC
stock pickups might raise GNP by around $7 billion as of January,
third recession year, as compared with the "no support" level.
However, the price effects upon GNP indicated in Chart 8 would
amount to only $1 billion or so as of that date, so that total GNP
might reach about $283 billion, compared with $281 billion under the
present program and $275 billion in the absence of price supports.
Disposable income might be around $210 billion as of that date,
with the $2 billion increase as compared with the present program
going mostly to farm operators. The consumer price index, how-
ever, might be only 1 per cent above the level which would obtain
in the absence of price supports.
This would undoubtedly come closer to stabilizing the gross and
net incomes, of farmers than any of the other programs discussed.
It would do less than the other programs to stabilize the general
price level and the level of wage rates. However, prices of food
would be only about 2 per cent higher at retail than they would have
been in the absence of farm price supports.
The balance sheet for this program, then, shows slightly greater
stability in total GNP and disposable income, and moderately less
stability in prices and wage rates. However, the peak annual cost
of compensatory payments, around $3 billion a year, would have
serious political drawbacks if it were charged to the farm price
support program as such. It might also be challenged by nonfarm
people as providing farmers with a higher level of income protec-
tion than would be provided to others under the severe recession
conditions we have assumed.
EFFECFS OF SHIFTING FROM THE PRESENT PROGRAM TO
ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS AT THE PRESENT TIME (MAY 1954)
This question is the focal point of current debate over farm price
support policy. Here we must step out of the "timeless" hypotheti-
cal preoccupations of the earlier part of this paper and face up to
historic time.
In this area, too, there are certain misconceptions which should
be set straight. The present program, involving mandatory sup-
port at 90 per cent of parity for the six basic crops, is in effect for
1954 crops. Changes in legislation will not affect the levels of price
support for basic crops until the summer or fall of 1955. The level
of price support for dairy products has recently been lowered from
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90 to 75 per cent of parity, but thisactionwas within the discretion
of the Secretary of Agriculture under the present law. (In view of
existing surpluses of dairy products, it may be argued that the lan-
guage in the present law that milk and butterfat shall be supported
at such levels "as will insure an adequate supply" practically re-
quired this step.)
Hence, except for a possible further sagging of market prices
below loan rates during the spring and summer of 1955 in anticipa-
tion of lower support levels in the following year, the price support
alternatives now under debate could have little or no effect on gen-
eral economic stability before the summer of 1955.
The key elements now in controversy are as follows:
Modernized Parity. Four of the basic crops are still supported at
90 per cent of the old parity standard. At the present time, new
parity prices for these crops are lower than their old parities by
the following percentages: wheat 14, corn 11, cotton 3, and pea-
nuts 19. Under present world price and domestic carry-over con-
ditions, market prices for these crops would probably fall by very
nearly these percentages if a sudden shift were made from old to
new parities.
Under existing legislation the old parity formula will continue to
apply to these crops until January 1, 1956. Hence the old parity
standard will be used in setting loan rates for 1955 crops, but new
parity will be available for use (and, so far as the letter of exist-
ing law is concerned, must be used) in setting loan rates for 1956
crops of these four commodities.
Minimum Price Support Percentages. If no new legislation is
passed in 1954, the minimum price support schedules of the Agri-
cultural Act of 1949 will be available for use with respect to 1955
crops. In view of the very large carry-overs in prospect at the be-
ginning of the 1955 crop year, wheat prices could then be supported
at as low as 75 per cent of parity, cotton prices at as low as 80 per
cent, and corn prices at about 85 per cent. Hence, in spite of the fact
that old parity would continue to prevail for these crops in 1955,
support prices for the 1955 crops could be reduced by about 15,
10, and 5 per cent of parity respectively. (However, the Secretary of
Agriculture would have discretionary power under the 1949 act to
support prices above these minimum levels and could moderate
this transition if it seemed desirable to do so.)
The combination of these possible drops in parity percentages
in 1955, followed by an abrupt shift to the new parity standard in
1956, is a serious matter to producers of the commodities affected
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and one in which legislators concerned with the stability of both
the farm and the general economy are keenly interested. This has
been recognized in the President's farm program, which provides
two major features intended to assure a smooth transition. The first
of these is that parity prices of the four crops would be reduced by
only 5percent a year, beginning in 1956, until the new parity
level is reached. Cotton• would move to the new parity standard in
1956. Corn would be practically there in 1957. Wheat would reach
new parity in 1958, and peanuts in 1959.
The second major feature of the President's farm program is a
$2.5 billion set-aside, including 400 to 500 million bushels of wheat,
S to 4 million bales of cotton, and possibly certain other products.
The quantities of wheat and cotton set aside would be excluded
from actual supplies of these commodities in computing the sup-
ply percentages upon which minimum support prices are based. If
we assume average yields of wheat and cotton in 1954, this leads
to minimum support percentages for wheat of 80 to 85 per cent of
parity and for cotton of 82 to 86 per cent of parity in Quanti-
ties in the set-aside are to be disposed of outside of normal com-
mercial channels if possible; they can be released into normal chan-
nels only if market prices exceed 105 per cent of parity. It is ex-
pected that the set-aside provision will also help to strengthen
market prices of wheat and cotton and keep them closer to the loan
rates.
However, the set-aside quantities of wheat and cotton would
continue to be counted in the total supplies of these commodities
for purposes of determining marketing quotas. Given average yields
each year over the next three or four years, the President's farm
program, as well as the program now in existence, would likely call
for marketing quotas on wheat through 1957 and cotton through
1956, This would probably be true also under the Agricultural Act of
•1949.
The effects of these various possible transitions can be summarized
briefly. The minimum provisions of the Agricultural Act of 1949
would reduce farm income (centering on January 1956) by about
$.4 billion on the five basic cash crops (cotton, wheat, tobacco,
peanuts, and rice) as compared with the program now in opera-
tion. Cash receipts from sales of corn and other feed grains might
15Thesepercentages depend also upon estimated utilization of wheat and
cotton during the 1954 and 1955 crop years and upon the levels of marketing
quptas announced for 1955 crops.
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drop slightly—probably not more than $.1 billion. The drop in
corn loan rates to around 85 per cent of parity would have some
slight effects on livestock production and prices later in the crop
year. The net further cash income reduction in the 1956 crop year,
compared with the present program including old parity, might be
around $.25 billion, with another $.1 or .2 billion showing up on
livestock products in 1957.
The President's farm program would result in price supports for
cotton, wheat, and corn averaging perhaps 5 to 7 per cent below
the present level in 1955 and perhaps 7 or 8 per cent lower than
the present level in 1956. The margin is likely to average little or no
greater than this in 1957 and later years. Thus, as compared with
an extension of the present price support program for basic crops,
the President's farm program might involve drops in farm income
on the order of $.2 billion in 1955 and perhaps another $.2 billion
in 1956. This level might be approximately maintained in the year
or two immediately following. Compared with the effects of a
severe economic recession, which in the absence of farm price
supports could involve as much as $5 or 6 billion of cash farm
income, the magnitudes involved in a shift from the existing pro-
gram to the President's farm program are almost negligible.
It cannot be denied, however, that either the President's program
or the Agricultural Act of 1949 would lead to significant reductions
in the level of cash farm income from wheat. The effects on cash
income from cotton and from feed grains and livestock products
would be small—perhaps almost negligible.
As compared with the present program, an abrupt shift to the
Agricultural Act of 1949, which is now (May 1954) on the books for
application to 1955 and later crops, could result in additional suc-
cessive impacts in the autumns of 1955 and 1956 of at most half a
billion dollars each year. The impacts would be most severe in the
specialized wheat areas and would pose serious readjustment prob-
lems for wheat producers. However, the consequences for the rest
of the economy could scarcely exceed a reduction of $1 billion or
thereabouts at the GNP or disposable income level.
The coinCidence of such a transition with the onset of a recession
might lead some lay economists to argue that the transition caused
the recession. However, on the basis of the models and arguments
presented here, this is a much heavier burden than a change in the
farm price support program will bear. Its initial effects would do
very little to aggravate a recession already under way, and its con-
sequences, except for producers of the crops. directly affected, would
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speedily be lost sight of if forces originating in the nonfarm sectors
of the economy were sufficient to carry the recession to any con-
siderable depth.
COMMENT
JAMES T. BONNEN, Harvard University 0
Tomy knowledge, this is the first quantitative attempt to evalu-
ate directly the impact of an agricultural price support program on
the whole economy. It is a pioneer effort, and Fox has a significant
and most thoughtful paper. In particular it is interesting methodo-
logically. I do question, however, whether the quantitative results
of the model actually support his conclusion that the present agri-
cultural price support program would lift GNP by 8 per cent in
the depths of his hypothetical depression. Fox's models are ex-
pressed in money terms with no adjustment for price level changes.
It is not possible to extract a general price level index from the data,
but Fox does calculate a "consumer price index." Deflating "per-
sonal disposable income" by this index brings one to the conclusion
that "real" disposable income would be higher if one eliminated
all agricultural price support programs (when presumably these
programs are financed out of a deficit). The implication for ag-
gregate demand and GNP are clear. To be more specific, in Table
11 of the paper, at the depth of the hypothetical depression, "total
disposable personal income" was $208 billion under the present
support program and $204 billion with no program, resulting in a
difference of $4 billion added to demand by the support program.
However, in the same table there is a consumer price index which,
in the trough of the depression, is estimated at 106 under the pres-
ent system of support prices and at 108 with no supports at all.
Deflating the income figures by the relevant index number, one
gets a "real" disposable personal income of $196.2 billion with the
current support program operating, but an income of $198 billion
with no support program! According to this calculation, the net
effect of the present price support program was to reduce "real"
disposable income by $1.8 billion. Fox will admit that this is an
unexpected quantitative conclusion and will perhaps concur in the
opinion that this result is due to the structural relationships which
he posits and perhaps more particularly to one or two of the im-
0Presentlyassistant professor of agricultural economics at Michigan State
University.
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plicit "path-multipliers" which we can all admit are elusive cl:eatures
at best.
Much of Fox's structural data comes from work done in the old
Bureau of Agricultural Economics in connection with the Inter-
industry Relations Study of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This
study employs W. W. Leontief's input-output technique of general
equilibrium analysis. Fox has done a good job of adapting this data
for his use here, but I believe we should be under no illusions as to•
the limitations to a more extensive use of this type of analytical tool
in business cycle investigations and in any specific attempt, such as
we have here, to evaluate the effect of price level changes on ag-
gregate demand. I hasten to add that Fox has not become involved
in these difficulties. He has used the input-output framework in the
only way in which I think it can be applied at its present state of
development—that is, to provide descriptive and partial structural
information which is otherwise unobtainable. Briefly, there seems
to me to be three facts from which most difficulties arise. (1) The
simple static model assumes a fixed input structure (the input-
output equations can be said to be linear and homogeneous), which
of course means that the "law of diminishing returns" does not ap-
ply (i.e. we have constant costs). (2) There is a unique or fixed
demand and consumption structure given by the input-output table.
There are no substitution possibilities in any realistic sense and
consequently no meaningful explanation of consumption or pro-
ducers' demand. Any attempt to explain changes in demand within
the model would necessitate introducing "households" into the
structural matrix, taking it out of the "bill of goods." If no additional
changes are made, the income elasticity of demand for each com-
modity turns out to be unit elasticity—an unusual situation, to say
the least, with the resulting calculations of induced demand be-
coming extremely unrealistic. Given the unreal results of the static
model, if any accelerator action is added in, as it must be in the dy-
namic model, estimates of induced demand would likely be pre-
posterous. It is necessary to provide leakage for the system on a
fairly arbitrary and large scale before the answers become realistic.
(3) The final fact is that the structure of payments for the factors
of production is also fixed. Consequently, relative prices and wage
rates are assumed to remain the same. It is to be noted also that the
absolute level of all priccs has no meaning in the system.
A dynamic model is necessary if one is to handle either a com-
plete cycle or the phase of falling aggregate demand. in other words,
one must introduce, in addition to the structure of product flows,
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a set of structural equations for the stocks of the economy (the in-
ventories and fixed assets). The static model will function properly
only under conditions where no problems of idle stocks or disin-
vestment are to be met. The use of stocks in the system introduces
an accelerator action with all of the attendant difficulties of han-
dling the necessary "leaks" and "feedbacks" so that the system will
converge at a reasonable level. The usual dynamic input-output
model is nonlinear in the sense of being irreversible, so that the
same model cannot be used to handle the ups as well as the downs
of the cycle without extensive or clumsy additional assumptions—
and then I doubt if it is possible to build a model which can move
continuously from the phase of positive accumulation to that of idle
stock. Probably the most important thing to realize is that con-
struction of a model of falling aggregate demand is far more dif-
ficult, both empirically and in theory, than building one of rising
aggregate demand. Input-output analysis appears to provide no
practical way of integrating a theory of money into its system; it
assumes a constant interest rate and deals only in "real" terms.
Even when, by operating on the system from the outside, shifts
in prices are achieved, relative statements are all that can be ob-
tained from the model, and a shift in the absolute level of one or all
prices has no operational meaning.
I wish to point out again that Fox has not become involved in
these difficulties. But it should be clear that any attempt to apply
input-output analysis to price-demand or business cycle problems
in a rigorous fashion, either as a closed-static or an open-dynamic
system, is at best a dubious. and difficult procedure.
Fox indicates that the farm price support program in 1953 cli-
reetly involved commodities accounting for only 45 per cent of
total cash receipts to agriculture. From the point of view of de-
pression policy this is an important feature of the current support
program. While it is undoubtedly true, as Fox's model indicates,
that average farm income is increased by the support program, the
case is not so straightforward as it might appear at first. In a situa-
tion in which, for example, a dozen commodities are selling below
parity prices in a free market and only half have parity supports,
the prices of the unsupported commodities might easily be ad-
versely affected. This would seem most likely to be the case if the
supported commodities have a greater elasticity of demand than
the nonsupported ones. Historically, we can note that at no time
have all of the commodities selling below parity been supported in
the market at the same instant. Note, too, that those commodities
351FARM PRiCE SUPPORT PROCRAMS
most often supported have been products like wheat, corn, and
cotton, for which demand is rather inelastic. Conceivably, in a gen-
eral depression it might cost less per dollar of induced demand to
support all farm products than to support just a limited number, as
we tend to do at present.
The starting point from which comparisons of alternative models
are made deserves some comment. The results of the comparisons of
different policies depend not only on the nature of the policies them-
selves but also upon the condition of the economy or model at the
time at which the policy is applied. For example, the situation in
which agriculture finds itself today is quite different from that of
the late twenties, preceding the Great Depression. Although real
net farm income fell by about one-third between 1947 and 1953,
agriculture's financial liquidity remains so much greater today than
in the twenties that in all likelihood, if the same price policy had
been implemented during the late twenties and were implemented
at present, the reaction of the farmer and the effects on aggregate
demand would be very different. Also, the fact that many of the
present-day farmers experienced the depression of the thirties and
still remember it quite vividly will condition the manner in which
they react to various policies. All of this is related to the consider-
ation we must give to the impact that different farm policies have
upon the expectations of the various sectors of the economy. One
cannot very readily introduce expectations into a model, but for
policy planning purposes, where the goal is the maintenance of
aggregate demand, some evaluation must be made of the effect of
the policy via expectations upon demand. Forward pricing, perhaps,
is a good example of how some expectations can be fairly success-
fully structured for planning purposes.
Let us consider the production control measures which operate
under the present law and which Fox had to take into consideration
in his evaluation of the price support program. Despite all of the
hullabaloo over "conservation" and "production adjustments," the
primary purpose of production control measures is price support.
In fact, it would seem that depression conditions would be the
poorest of times to attempt production adjustments. Since the de-
mand for all products is falling, increasing the production of one
commodity by reducing that of another only shifts the price support
problem from one product to another. This is another reason for
placing the emphasis of depression price policy upon the expan-
sion of over-all demand and upon maintaining output in all lines
of production.
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Consider too that, although there is a storage program, the pres-
ent price support system operates to a significant extent through
raising prices and curtailing output in a severe depression, such as
Fox has set up. It is difficult to know to what extent this means that
the increase in farm demand for industrial production is offset by
the decline in nonf arm demand due to a relative increase in the cost
of living. It is reasonable to expect that the use of a different support
technique, such as compensatory price payments, would have a
greater impact on aggregate demand. Indeed, Fox's model indi-
cates this, although it would increase the total cost of the support
program. It was a little surprising to find the cost as high as Fox's
model indicates, although he may be quite right. It would still seem
to be a debatable point quantitatively.
Ultimately, in any over-all policy consideration, the economist
must answer a quantitatively difficult and fundamental question not
within the scope of Fox's paper. That question is: At what point will
government expenditures in farm programs provide less of an in-
crease in aggregate demand than would be returned if the expendi-
tures were made on the nonfarm sector? Of course, economic ques-
tions as to marginal rates of return are, in actual policy planning,
radically altered and also blurred by political and social factors.
An evaluation of the long-run impact of agricultural price sup-
port programs on the rest of the economy is outside the scope of
Fox's paper. But it should be mentioned that the possible methods
for ultimate financing of the price support program can have quite
varied effects on the economy, and the choice should always be a
serious policy consideration.
A chronically neglected problem of agriculture which none of
these alternative programs ever faces is agricultural poverty. This
is bad enough in periods of general prosperity, not to speak of severe
depressions. None of the programs under present consideration will
have any effective impact on the extremely low incomes of about
2 million American farm families.
I should like to suggest in conclusion the possibility that pro-
grams which succeed in adding to the stability of the economic sys-
tem may also lower the average level at which the economy operates
or retard the rate of economic progress. Also, conversely, a higher
average level of activity may be gained only at the cost of greater
instability. Any potential policy maker should also be aware of the
well-established fact (often ignored in policy discussions) that gen-
eral depressions are not caused by agricultural difficulties and that
the only maimer in which effective income stability and progress
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can be maintained in agriculture is by seeing to it that the rest of
the economy is stable and economically progressive.
These comments, I believe, bring up matters' which must be
seriously considered in the determination of any depression policy
for agriculture or the economy in general. I should like to add that
Fox has presented one of the most complete models I have ever
seen constructed for the purpose of analyzing the internal rela-
tionships of one sector of the economy to the total. It is a significant
example of his obvious ability and long experience in handling eco-
nomic statistics.
REPLY BY Fox
Early in his discussion Bonnen raises a point which, while not
surprising, was certainly not brought out in my paper. When be
deflates the disposable personal income figures in the last column
of Table 11 by the corresponding consumer price indexes, he ob-
tains a "real" disposable income $1.8 billion (about .9 per cent)
lower with the price support program than without it! I would not
attach much importance to the direction of this difference, as it is
almost within the range of rounding errors—the consumer price
index is recorded only to the nearest 1 per cent. But there are rea-
sons for believing that the "present price support program" de-
scribed in my paper may be no more than neutral in its effects on
aggregate output and employment.
First, the program reduces farm output. In my model this reduc-
tion (as of January, third recession year) amounts to at least .5 bil-
lion 1954 dollars. Second, as commercial demand is less than unit
elastic, domestic users pay a larger dollar amount (roughly 1 billion
1954 dollars) for a reduced supply of farm products. This, in itself,
would tend to deflect some purchasing power away from nonfarm
goods and services and to reduce nonfarm employment. These two
effects should be approximately offset, but perhaps no more than
offset, by larger purchases on the part of farm families, whose net
incomes were estimated to be $2 billion higher (as of January, third
recession year) with the program than without it.
The apparent neutrality of the price support program with re-
spect to total output and employment raises a number of questions.
If the program reduces the drift in nonfarm prices and wage rates,
does it slow down inventory liquidation and help to maintain busi-
ness investment? This seems plausible, but I believe it would be
extremely difficult to quantify these effects. Second, in formulat-
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ing the objectives of countercyclical policy, how much weight should
be given to price stability as such, both farm and nonfarm? Price
deflation increases the real burden of all obligations which were
fixed in money terms before the onset of recession, and there is a
widespread impression that falling prices are viewed with great
concern by the business community. Certainly the severity of price
dislocations and cost-price squeezes tends to increase with the speed
and amplitude of general price deflation.
Perhaps it is enough that farm price supports, viewed as short-
term defenses against recession, substantially increase the purchas-
ing power of farmers even though their effects on aggregate non-
farm employment may be negligible. In the absence of public in-
tervention, agriculture responds to recession by reducing prices, and
industry (to a large extent) by reducing output and employment.
Public po].icy has been directed toward stabilizing prices in agri-
culture and employment in other sectors. The respective approaches
have a simple and direct appeal, and it would be difficult to prove
that either of them is wrong.
I should like to correct one of Bonnen's statements. I did not con-
dude that the present price support program "would lift GNP by
8 per cent." I said that it would, in my model, reduce the decline in
GNP by 8 per cent. The magnitude involved, about $6 billion, is
only 2 per cent of the level of GNP.
The argument for Bonnen's hypothesis that prices of unsupported
commodities may be adversely affected by the existence of price
supports on other commodities is not clear to me, perhaps because
some of his assumptions are not stated. In actual practice, price
supports as such have generally tended to raise the prices of other
farm products rather than to lower them. Acreage restrictions on
price-supported commodities, unless accompanied by tight controls
over the use of the acres diverted, may lead to increased produc-
tion of unrestricted commodities and thus to lower prices for such
of these as are not supported and as do not compete in demand
with price-supported commodities. But this effect is based on acre-
age restrictions and elasticities of supply, whereas Bonnen seems
to base his argument exclusively on elasticities of demand.
The rest of Bonnen's points are well taken, in my opinion. Price
support programs are not set up exclusively or even primarily as
countercydical devices. In a broader context, such programs might
also be appraised in terms of their effects on the rate of
cal advance in agriculture, on the efficiency of resource use within
agriculture and the mobility of resources between agriculture and
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other sectors, on international, trade and political relations, on the
long-run growth of the economy, and on the short-run expansibility
of agriculture to meet emergency needs. I believe that a strong and
moderately flexible price support program will make a positive con-
tribution to most of these objectives, and that some negative aspects
of the present program can be better corrected by modification than
by abandonment of price supports. But these questions are beyond
the scope of my paper.
356.